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THE MATHEW 0. TOBRINER
MEMORIAL LECTURE*
It's Time to "Unfix" the Criminal
Justice System
By

ABNER J. MIKVA**

One could not be interested in the prison system (as I have been
since my earliest days in the Illinois legislature) without coming across
the contributions of Justice Tobriner. I was part of a congressional delegation that visited some of the California prisons in the early 1970s, and I
recall a brief meeting with Justice Tobriner in which he expressed his
concern that we send people to prison without really knowing what we
expect to accomplish.
Sending someone to prison clearly has the effect of protecting society from further wrongdoing by that particular person for the period of
confinement. Once we leave that given objective, the other things we
hope to do by imprisonment are in controversy, doubt, and conflict. Do
we expect to reform wrongdoers at our reformatories, make them penitent at our penitentiaries, correct them at our houses of correction? If
those are our expectations, we flunk. We cannot agree as a society as to
what we want to accomplish through our criminal justice system. Every
tool we use is fraught with controversy, whether it is the death penalty,
furloughs, halfway houses, parole, or conjugal visits.
I would like to concentrate, in this lecture, on one such controversy,
and that is the period of confinement we assign to convicted felons to our
* This lecture was presented at Hastings College of the Law on October 19, 1992. The
Mathew 0. Tobriner Lecture, in honor of Justice Mathew Tobriner of the Supreme Court of
California, was established by close friends and relatives of the Justice to serve as a memorial
to him and his life's work.
** Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. As one who has always
striven for innocence by association, the author is particularly grateful for the invitation to
deliver the Tobriner Lecture. He remembers the strong impression that some of Justice Tobriner's opinions and other writings had on him, and how he assigned Justice Tobriner to the
category of great American jurists who have greatly influenced and molded our profession, our
courts, and our laws.
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federal penal institutions: the relationship between the crime and the
punishment. It is not a new controversy. The Old Testament speaks of
"an eye for an eye" and "a tooth for a tooth." While this concept is used
as the basic historical justification for capital punishment (the ultimate
sentence) and for the general "toughness" of our punishment provisions,
some rabbinical scholars state that the Bible commandment really proposes restitution: that the offender must use his eye or tooth to perform
substituted service for the victim. Hammurabi, in his famous Code,
picked up the "eye for an eye" concept in a strict sense, but we have to
take Hammurabi with some grains of salt. He also ordained that "if a
man has stolen a sheep or ass or pig or ship, whether from the temple or
the palace, he shall pay thirtyfold. If he be a poor man, he shall render
tenfold. If the thief has nought to pay, he shall be put to death." 1 There
were not too many en forma pauperis pleas during Hammurabi's time.
Over the thousands of years since the rabbis and Hammurabi held
forth, we have continued to dispute the function of punishment in an
organized society. The current federal criminal laws synthesize this dispute by including all of the functions that the Congress thinks are served
by punishment. Title 18, Section 3553(a)(2) declares that federal courts
shall impose sentences which reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, afford deterrence to future criminal conduct,
protect the public from further criminal conduct by that particular defendant, and provide "correctional treatment" to the defendant. At the
very end of the section, restitution is thrown in, almost as an afterthought function of the sentence to be imposed. This section of Title 18
provides the conceptual framework for the federal sentencing guidelines,
a reform which Congress enacted in 1984. While I was not present for
the enactment, I was present for the implementation, and the history of
the sentencing reform effort is useful to explain how we came to our
present troubles. It will also confirm the need to "unfix" our criminal
justice system.
As I have already indicated, we have never been able to agree, as a
country, upon what we seek to accomplish by the punishment phases of
criminal law. As a result, whatever regimen is in place has always been
in disfavor. In the late 1960s, the current disfavor concerned the "indeterminate sentencing" regimen that had been in place for some time in
this country. That system, you may recall, allowed judges considerable
flexibility to sentence within statutory limits set by Congress and further
allowed parole authorities to put a convicted felon out on "parole" after
some portion of the sentence had been served. These two separate flexi1. CODE OF HAMMURABI § 8 (C.H.W. Johns trans., 1903) (c.
2250 B.C.).
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bility engines led to widespread and numerous complaints. Hardliners
railed against the soft-hearted judges who gave sentences at the low end
of the permissible range. They railed against the soft-hearted parole
boards that turned recidivists loose to sin some more. Obviously there
were no headlines to proclaim the success of a parolee or the rehabilitation of a felon who served a short sentence. The press fully reported the
long parade of horribles who committed further crimes while out on parole or after serving a short sentence given out by "Judge Softy."
There were other complaints, to my mind more legitimate. Over my
years as a legislator, I had visited a large number of state and federal
prisons all over the country. The most common criticism among the
prisoners, aside from the complaint that they were convicted despite
their innocence, was the disparity of their sentences in relation to other
felons in the institution. Obviously, with several hundred federal judges
and thousands of state judges, all exercising independent discretion in
their sentencing procedures, the resultant sentences varied. There was
and is dispute as to how many "Judge Softys" there are. There is no
dispute that there were and are many "Judge Maximums." The parole
boards were being criticized legitimately because of the growing recognition that the task that had been assigned to them-predicting the future
conduct of convicted felons-was virtually impossible. Also, crime was
rising generally, and like the Willie Horton of later years, parole boards
became scapegoats for the increasing insecurity of the American public.
Parenthetically, I am sure that most Americans would gladly go back to
the insecurity level of the 1970s that led to these far-reaching reforms,
compared to the insecurity level that we have since the reforms. I claim
no causal nexus between the current level of insecurity and the reforms,
but rather an obvious absence of any such nexus between the reforms and
the security level.
Thus the stage was set for Congress to "do something" as the crime
issue continued to percolate. As is true of most reform efforts, there were
numerous actors and threads to the sentencing reform effort. Time does
not permit me to go through all of them; indeed I probably am unaware
of many pieces that went into the buildup for change. Let me recite very
briefly a little bit of the history that I know.
Senator Ted Kennedy was Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee in the 1970s and at least entertaining thoughts of a run for the
presidency. Some of his staff were eager to show that he was not a "kneejerk" liberal on the issue of law and order, and the Senator was talking
about the abolition of the indeterminate sentencing scheme in favor of a
"flat-time" alternative. I had visited enough prisons, and had been
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beaten over the head enough by constituents and opponents who accused
me of being "soft on crime," that the idea was very intriguing to me.
I recall that in 1978, Dan Lungren, the current Attorney General of
California, was elected to the Congress and took his place on the House
Judiciary Committee. I was then on the Committee and as we discussed
our agenda for the coming session, he stated that he was an advocate of
"truth in sentencing." That was the first time that I had heard the term,
but I told Congressman Lungren that if he was talking about getting rid
of indeterminate sentencing, I was very interested. We agreed that in
order to go to a "flat-time" system, we needed to reduce the statutory
ranges to something approximating the actual "sitting time" that convicted felons had to do. We asked a staffer to make such comparisons,
and when he presented his work to the two of us, I remember that Dan
Lungren turned very pale. One of the crimes we had compared in our
study was bank robbery. The statute had a range of up to 20 years. The
average sitting time for convicted bank robbers was 3 years. "If you
think that I am going back to the people of Orange County and explain
to them why I proposed to reduce the penalty for bank robbery from 20
years to 3 years, you're crazy," he said. That was the end of truth in
sentencing for that term of Congress.
But the problems didn't go away. The disparities in sentencing
could not be defended by anyone, and the emotional charge of the other
issues became stronger. No one in Congress, however, wanted to bite the
bullet that Congressman Lungren found so unappetizing; no one wanted
to propose actual reductions in the statutory maximum in order to move
to a flat-time system. Yet, even the most hard-line legislator was not
advocating that we convert all of the statutory maximum sentences to
actual prison sentences. The debate dragged on for several years after I
left the Congress to become a judge. Finally, in 1984, Congress did what
it frequently does to resolve such political dilemmas: it punted to a
commission.
This was no ordinary commission. The Sentencing Commission created under the 1984 statute was intended to be and has become the substitute policy maker for the Congress. The statute abolished the parole
mechanism, and the Commission was charged with creating a precise set
of "guidelines" to cover every variable in the sentencing scheme. Without any effort to reconcile the obvious tensions created in the "purposes
of sentencing" section that I mentioned earlier, the Commission created
a grid system which gives mild rewards to those who accept responsibility for their crimes or who cooperate with the government in convicting
other felons, the "flipping" process, as it is known in the criminal court
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corridors. In virtually all other cases, the new guidelines were based on
the premise that longer is better. When coupled with the minimummandatory sentences that Congress has ordained for more and more
crimes, we have created the largest prison population in our history, and
currently, in the world. The dramatic rise in the federal prison population has been mind-boggling. In 1981, soon after I left the Congress, we
had 26,000 inmates. By 1985, when we initiated the sentencing guidelines, the number had risen to 36,000. By 1992, the number of federal
inmates was 71,000, a virtual doubling of the prison population in just
seven years.
The costs of this reform have been staggering. It costs us approximately $25,000 per year for each felon in the federal system. That is
more than the annual cost of sending somebody to Harvard Law School.
And while one could argue about which institution inflicts more harm on
its inmates, Harvard is not paid for with taxpayer dollars.
The other costs may be even more enormous. We have flooded the
federal courts with criminal trials, partly because the federal sentencing
guidelines are so much more attractive to prosecutors. In previous days,
many of the drug offenses that now find their way to federal court were
tried in the state courts, which usually have nearly concomitant jurisdiction. Not any more. In the District of Columbia, for example, where the
prosecutor is the same person for both the local and the federal system,
he freely acknowledges that more cases are prosecuted in the federal
courts because of the stiff sentencing guidelines.
The guidelines and the minimum-mandatory sentences, having removed most of the discretionary play in the sentencing system, make it
much more difficult to plea bargain. However one may feel about the
ethics of plea bargaining, it is beyond doubt that the existence of the
device saves a lot of cases from going to full trial. However, if the statute
prescribes a mandatory, fixed sentence for a crime, there is little with
which the parties may bargain.
Because criminal cases must be tried within a fairly limited period of
time, it has become almost impossible, in many federal courts, to get a
civil case tried at all. The district courts, the jewel of the federal court
system, if not of the court systems of the world, have been turned into
assembly line operations where drug peddlers are ground up and spewed
out into an overcrowded and ineffective prison system. District court
judges are frustrated beyond measure as they try to juggle the unjuggleable; they derive little satisfaction from a job that changed from one of
the best to one of the most onerous. Last term, one of our district judges
imposed an added sentence on a defendant because the defendant insisted
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on going to trial even though he did not have much of a defense to offer.
To my dismay, a majority of a panel of my court found that this was not
improper. While I sympathize with the judge in his frustration, I cannot
reconcile the constitutional right to a trial with the added punishment
meted out to a defendant solely because he exercised a constitutional
right.
Have we won the war on drugs? Not in my town and not in any
town that I know. Are we more secure in our homes and on our streets?
Not even an incumbent politician would take much credit for the good
that sentencing reform has done for his constituents. Are we making any
efforts to leave this path that has so beaten us? Not one whit! The crime
bill that was recently before the Congress and which some attacked as
being too "soft" on crime contained still more minimum-mandatory sentencing provisions. The Sentencing Commission, charged with the responsibility of revising the guidelines periodically, holds hearings, listens
to the almost universal litany of complaints from the trial judges and
others, and tinkers at the edges with the grid system that has locked us
into the most ineffective punishment mechanism known to our history.
After all these years of trying a plan that works so poorly, it is time
to junk it. It is time to charge Congress, or some commission that it
punts to, with the responsibility of devising a system that works. That
probably means that we have to forge a consensus on what it is that we
want to accomplish with the criminal justice system and its sentencing
component. If we want to use the criminal justice system to win the war
on drugs, we probably have to build a lot of new prisons, create a lot of
new federal courts, and put even more of our young population in jail for
very long periods of time. I still am not sure that we could ever win that
way, but at least we would have a shot.
If, on the other hand, we want to use the system and its sentencing
component to promote a more secure society, we probably have to go
back to square one. We need earlier intervention in the criminal syndrome. A teacher colleague of my wife insisted that she could determine
which of the third graders in her inner-city classroom would end up in
our penitentiary. She was probably more right than wrong. If anti-societal tendencies can be spotted at such tender years, shouldn't we address
these issues early on, when it is easier and far cheaper to do something?
When the violator being processed is a first offender, don't we need to
apply more sophisticated remedies than either our present probation system or the reform schools offer? Both of them have turned out to be
great tools for culturing recidivism and not much else. We need special
schools, boot camps, job training centers, and job placement programs.
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But mostly, we have to go back to the drawing boards and figure out
what it is we are buying when we impose draconian sentences to our
federal prisons. If the felon is young enough, the longer sentence only
provides a better finishing school education in the crime business. If the
felon is old enough, we are paying a pretty penny to confine somebody
who at worst would probably add to our homeless population if we
turned him loose. Crime basically is a young person's game, and the
older felons tend mostly to get sickly and expensive to imprison. The
current figures suggest that prisoners over fifty cost almost $60,000 per
year to keep because of the added medical costs. If we really are passing
out those long sentences just to vent our spleen, I am not sure that we
can afford such expensive spleen.
I would hope that the Congress could appoint still another commission-not to review the actual sentencing grids, but to take the testimony
necessary to look at our punishment system honestly-to see what it accomplishes and where it fails. Maybe such a commission could give the
Congress enough cover to propose a wholly new system of punishments
that doesn't start with punishing society. I think the first ingredient of
such a new system would be restitution, rather than using that aim as an
afterthought to our punishment goals. First and foremost, the criminal
justice system should consider and make whole the victim. Were we to
put restitution first, such a reform would have one immediate benefit: we
would have to establish a real work program as the beginning of our new
system.
Secondly, the length of sentence should have some meaning. How
long does it take to teach a felon how to read and write? To learn a real
trade? How long does it take for a felon to "burn out" age-wise? Does
length of sentence really affect deterrence? If so, how long does a deterrent sentence have to be? We don't have the answers to any of these
questions, and we have never really looked for such answers.
Finally, the type of institution and length of sentence both must be
related to the kind of person we are sending there. If the person is totally
incorrigible-a Specht, a Hinckley-let's not turn him or her loose at all.
If we know we are going to have to live with the felon again, let's figure
out how to make him more acceptable to our society by providing a job,
an education, and a place to live.
Above all, we must stop trying to use the criminal justice system for
problems that it can't cure, such as drugs, poverty, and gambling. The
price of just hating our rule-breakers and meting out long prison
sentences is hurting us in our pockets and everywhere else.
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A primary reason for leaving our caves and forming a society was to
protect ourselves from the animals that threatened us, whatever number
of legs they had. We likewise created a legal system to protect us and to
punish the two-legged species who broke our rules. The criminal justice
system, as it evolved over the thousands of years since that exodus from
the caves, never really settled on the rationale for that punishment. Vengeance, deterrence, rehabilitation, restitution-all are mixed up in a crucible and poured into the system without a recipe or a measuring cup.
Currently, it is a very bad cake that we are asked to digest. We sorely
need some better bakers in the Congress and the state legislatures if we
are to end our national stomachache. And having baked a tortured metaphor long enough, I am done.

